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Zimbabwe National Vulnerability Assessment Committee


in collaboration with the SADC FANR Vulnerability Assessment Committee



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## Zimbabwe Emergency Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment Report



**ZIMBABWE**

*Some 7,2182,000 people (52% of the population) will require an estimated 345,000 MT of emergency cereal food assistance through March 2003.*

20 December 2002  
Harare

Prepared in collaboration with the Ministry of Finance – Food and Nutrition Council, Ministry of Agriculture- National Early Warning Unit, Civil Protection Unit, WFP, FEWS NET, SC(UK), FAO, and IFRC with financial support from Government of Zimbabwe, DFID, WFP, and USAID.

## **PREFACE**

This emergency food security assessment is regionally coordinated by the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Food, Agriculture, and Natural Resources (FANR) Vulnerability Assessment Committee (VAC), in collaboration with international partners (WFP, FEWS NET, SC(UK), CARE, FAO, UNICEF, and IFRC). National VACs in each country--a consortium of government, NGO, and UN agencies—coordinated the assessments locally. This is the first of a series of rolling food security assessments to be conducted in affected countries throughout the region for the duration of the current food crisis.

The VAC assessment strategy has two principal axes. First, it uses a sequential process of 'best-practices' in assessment and monitoring, drawn from the extensive and varied experience of the VAC partners, to meet a broad range of critical information needs at both the spatial and socio-economic targeting levels. The sequential nature of the approach not only provides richer details of the "access side" of the food security equation, but it adds the very important temporal dimension as well. From an operational (i.e. response) perspective, the latter is critical. Second, by approaching food security assessment through a coordinated, collaborative process, the strategy integrates the most influential assessment and response players into the ongoing effort, thereby gaining privileged access to national and agency datasets and expert technicians and increases the likelihood of consensus between national governments, implementing partners, and major donors. This 'partnering' strategy links the major players and stakeholders including regional institutions, national governments, response agencies, NGOs and donors for on-going, intensive 'rolling' assessment coverage of food security conditions on the ground.

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

This report follows an initiation by the SADC Vulnerability Assessment Committee together with the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee. The report follows a survey, which was made possible through the generous financial contributions made by the Government of Zimbabwe, World Food Program (WFP), and DFID. Vehicle and in-kind support was provided by GOAL, FEWSNET, WFP, and FAO. Many government, NGO, and UN organizations participated in the field research. Their names and organizations are listed in Annex I.

***The ZimVAC warmly acknowledges support from these multiple organizations and looks forward to future collaboration!!!***

### ***Acronyms***

GDP	Gross Domestic Product
CFSAM	Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission
FEZ	Food Economy Zone
HEA	Household Economy Analysis
GMB	Grain Marketing Board
VAC	Vulnerability Assessment Committee
HHs	Households
ZDHS	Zimbabwe Demographic Health Survey
CSAFE	Consortium for Southern Africa Food Emergency
CSO	Central Statistics Office
AREX	Agricultural, Research, and Extension Service

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## I. Emergency Food Security Overview

The December ZimVAC assessment was intended to review trends in national and sub-national food security in Zimbabwe since the August/September ZimVAC assessment. The assessment used a combination of secondary data at the national level and primary data from community focus group interviews in 61 villages across the country.

The food security situation has deteriorated in all parts of the country. With planned imports of 617,727 MT of cereals food aid and commercial imports as at the end of November 2002, Zimbabwe will have a food deficit of 239,000 MT as at the end of the April 2002-March 2003 consumption year.

Distribution of GMB imports at the community level is inconsistent with reported imports at the national level. For the time period April 1, 2002 to December 1, 2002 total maize available from domestic availability, GMB imports, and food aid was 1.3 mil MT. The requirement for this time period was 1.1 mil MT, indicating a surplus of 200,000 MT at the national level.

At sub-national level, however, availability of a wide range of basic commodities continues to be limited. Forty percent of the communities visited reported that cereals were "not or rarely" available from the GMB and/or market. Other indicators such as coping strategies, food and livestock prices, and dietary intake also support the conclusion that cereal is extremely unavailable at the community level, despite reported national numbers indicating a surplus. This discrepancy between reported import levels at the national level and community availability of cereals warrants further investigation.

The price of maize on the black market has risen by 167% since August to an average of Z\$130 per kg. Livestock prices and payments for casual labour have increased nominally, but have fallen by 35-50% relative to the price of grain. Increased deaths of livestock due to both drought and disease have occurred. Casual labour opportunities have become more limited. Increased job losses and reduced remittances have been reported across the country. Many households are resorting to unusual and often harmful income-generating activities such as gold-panning, prostitution, theft and sale of household assets. Wild foods (fruits, leaves, roots, tubers and insects) are being consumed across the country as main meals.

The national human cereal consumption requirement for the period December to March is 744,576 MT. Given estimated in-country stocks of 50,000 MT, planned GMB imports of 361,219 MT, and planned food aid imports of 276,508 MT, the country is expected to have a four month deficit of 56,849 MT. A possible scenario based on current rates of GMB imports, however, is that the GMB may only be able to import 196,000 MT, leading to a national deficit of 222,068 MT. This is 30% of the national requirement, and would lead a severe food crisis in the coming months.

Prospects for the 2002-03 agricultural season appear poor. As of December 4<sup>th</sup>, only 38% of the area planted to maize last year had been planted this season. Serious shortages of inputs, especially fertilizers and tillage but also seed, have hampered planting, while a dry period during the second half of November has also worsened the situation.

The country is experiencing rapid macro economic decline as evidenced by annual inflation rates of 180%, a parallel market exchange rate of over 2,700% more than the official rate, and a GDP decline of 12% in 2002. Fuel shortages are rampant throughout the country, affecting all aspects of the economy.

The alarmingly high rates of HIV/AIDS (33% nationally) continue to undermine national and household food security

Following the land tenure transition of many commercial farms since the analysis conducted in August, the numbers of former commercial farm workers in need of assistance has provisionally been increased by 496,000, pending a comprehensive assessment planned for early 2003 by UNDP and the Department of Social Welfare. This has increased the total estimated population in need in Zimbabwe to 7,182,000 people.

Given carry-over effects on people's coping capacities from the current crisis, anticipated below normal harvests for the coming season, and the rapid economic decline, the Government of Zimbabwe and humanitarian agencies are strongly advised to begin preparing for serious and widespread food insecurity for the coming marketing year 2003/04.

## II. Methodology

### II-A. Objectives

The objective of this assessment was to update selected macro and micro indicators from the August assessment and to outline the implications of this for national food aid needs and sub-national targeting. The assessment gives an update of the impact of the macroeconomic policies on food security, looks at the level of imports compared to requirements, whether food availability and access at sub-national level is improving or worsening, the coping mechanisms being employed, and the linkage between nutrition and other factors and food security. Circumstances did not permit an assessment that would enable clear revisions to be made to the numbers needing food aid, but rather the assessment focused on the trends in food security at national and sub-national level, and their implications for the targeting of existing food aid resources.

### II-B. Methodology

The ZimVAC used a combination of primary and secondary data for this assessment. For national level information, secondary data was gathered from CSO, GMB, AREX, FEWS-NET, the national budget, the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe monthly reports, and from the ZimVAC's August assessment. Much of this data was compiled using pro formas developed by the Regional VAC for this round of assessments.

For the sub-national picture, the ZimVAC used community-level focus group interviews with mixed groups of community leaders, and separate women-only groups. Only communal and resettlement areas were covered; no interviews were carried out with communities in urban, mining or commercial farming areas. The interview reporting format is attached as Annex 3. Sampling of sites was based on the sites selected in August. The sites selected were aimed to be;

- Representative enough to draw FEZ and provincial profiles
- Drawn from the 22 FEZ sampled in August
- Cover areas with the highest population density

#### ***The Sampling Process***

***Clustering and random sampling techniques were adopted to draw up 62 wards as sampling units.***

- a) 62 of the 120 sites sampled in August 2002 were selected
- b) At least 2 sites per FEZ were considered in the selection
- c) At least 5 sites per province were selected
- d) The 62 sites selected would be proportionate to the population in the food economy zone
- e) For each ward selected, the village covered in the August survey was covered or a neighbouring village within the was used as a substitute if the intended site could not be visited
- f) A total of 122 community focus groups interviews were carried out in 61 communities. One team was prevented from carrying out interviews in Goromonzi district.

#### **A. Table 2.1 Selected Sites by Province**

<b>Province</b>	<b>No. of Sites</b>	<b>No. of Teams</b>	<b>No. of Food Economy Zones Sampled</b>
Manicaland	10	2	6
Mashonaland Central	6	1	4
Mashonaland East	5	1	4
Mashonaland West	6	1	5
Masvingo	10	2	7
Mat North	10	2	8
Mat South	5	1	5
Midlands	10	2	7
<b>Total</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>22</b>

*(zones cut across provinces)*

The field work was conducted by 12 teams with 33 researchers. The teams spent 6 days in the field and conducted 61 community focus group interviews.

## **II-C. Analysis**

Quantitative data from interview forms was entered using MS Access, and analysed using SPSS and MS Excel. Aggregation of results was carried out at the food economy zone<sup>1</sup> level, using the zones defined in the 1996 Risk Map report, with minor revisions agreed by the ZimVAC in December 2001<sup>2</sup>. Some data was then re-aggregated to the provincial level. Where possible, direct comparisons were made with data from the August assessment. The conclusions about relative changes in food security at sub-national level are based mainly on 4 key indicators: supplies since September of GMB food and food aid as a % of household requirements; changes in local market prices of maize grain since September; changes in casual labour payment rates/ grain terms of trade; and changes in livestock/ grain terms of trade. Relative changes in indicators across food economy zones were compared to the median national value for each indicator, and FEZs were then grouped based on whether they consistently showed a greater decline or improvement in food security.

Qualitative information was mainly collated in the form of brief provincial reports compiled by assessment team leaders. These reports are available on demand from the ZimVAC.

## **II-D. Constraints**

Overall the assessment was carried out smoothly, however there were some constraints experienced.

- The openness of focus group discussions on certain topics – particularly relating to the method of allocating and/ or distributing food - was constrained by the presence of political leaders and others recording interviews in the field.
- One site (Goromonzi) could not be covered when war veterans prevented the assessment team from carrying out its interview.
- A planned concurrent nutrition and health survey could not be carried out in the timeframe available, and therefore it is not possible to cross-check food security results with indicators on malnutrition as was intended.

## **III. National Level Food Security**

### **III-A. The Food Balance Sheet for Zimbabwe**

Food security at national level has remained problematic, as food imports trickle into the country and the harvest estimates have been maintained at levels estimated in August 2002. A total of 1.3 million MT of maize is officially reported to have been available from 1 April 2002 to December 1 2002, consisting of 788,389 MT from imports and 505,581 MT from harvest and carryover stocks (Table 3.1). The available maize should have been adequate to meet the consumption requirement of 1.1 million MT for the same time period. Based on imports alone, Zimbabwe should have had 72 percent of maize requirements met. However, the situation in the country at the community and household level does not accord with statistics indicating adequate cereal availability, as food shortages of commodities such as maize meal, cooking oil, sugar, bread, fresh milk have continued since February 2002.

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<sup>1</sup> A FEZ is defined as all the households in a geographical area where most households obtain their food and cash income by roughly the same combination of means (Seaman et al., 2000).

<sup>2</sup> Specifically, former commercial farming areas were split into resettlement and commercial farming zones, and the "Southwestern Lowveld Communal" and "Beitbridge Lowveld Communal" zones were merged.

Combining domestic availability, reported imports to date, and planned imports from all sources of 637,727 MT of cereal, the annual food balance for the 2002/03 consumption year (through March 2003) will equal a 239,000 MT deficit.

**Table 3.1. Zimbabwe National Food Balance 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2003.**

Zimbabwe Cereal Balance Sheet for 2002/2003 (Mt) 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2003		as at 11 December 2002				
	Maize	Millets	Wheat	Rice	All Grain	
<b>A. Potential Domestic Availability</b>	515,581	38,300	327,232	7,566	888,679	
Formal Opening Stocks (April 2002)	5,041	-	167,232	7,566	179,839	
Gross Harvest Production (estimate)	498,540	37,300	160,000	-	695,840	
Winter maize and early summer maize harvest (Estimate)	10,000	-	-	-	10,000	
Unmonitored Stocks : Farmers & other (estimate)	2,000	1,000	-	-	3,000	
<b>B. Annual Requirements</b>	1,993,655	178,063	398,312	13,697	2,583,727	
Gross Consumption Requirement	1,643,655	178,063	398,312	13,697	2,233,727	
Livestock, other uses and losses	350,000	-	-	-	350,000	
<b>C. Domestic Balance (DB) (A minus B)</b>	(1,478,074)	(139,763)	(71,080)	(6,131)	(1,695,048)	
D. Cross Substitution	(139,763)	139,763	-	-	-	
E. Cereal Exports to date (estimate)	-	-	-	-	-	
F. Cereal Commercial Imports to date (estimated)	650,000	-	30,000	-	680,000	
G. Private Sector maize imports for livestock feed (estimated)	30,000	-	-	-	30,000	
H. Cereal Food Aid Imports to date (estimated)	108,389	-	-	-	108,389	
Total Imports to date (as at beginning of April 2002)	788,389	-	30,000	-	818,389	
<b>I. Forecasted Closing Stocks Before Additional Imports (March 2003)</b>	(829,447)	-	(41,080)	(6,131)	(876,659)	
L. Planned Food Aid Imports outstanding	276,508	-	-	-	276,508	
M. Planned Commercial Imports outstanding	335,619	-	20,000	5,600	361,219	
Total Imports outstanding	612,127	-	20,000	5,600	637,727	
<b>O. Forecasted Deficit (Closing Stocks) after Imports (March 2003)</b>	(217,320)	-	(21,080)	(531)	(238,932)	
<b>Assumptions</b>						
Est. mid-year population	13,697,122	13,697,122	13,697,122	13,697,122	13,697,122	
Est. Human Annual Consumption Requirement. (Kgs/Person)	120	13	29	1	163	

### III-B. Harvest Outcomes (Summer and Winter Crops) for 2001/02 Season

The summer growing season harvest estimates for 2001/02 season have been maintained at 784,818 MT of cereals, composed of 498,540 MT of maize, 23,818 MT of sorghum, 3,570 MT of millets and 212,950 MT of wheat. The August estimate for the wheat harvest of 212,000 MT is now revised to 160,000 MT, and only about 10,000 to 15,000 MT could still be with farmers as they have retained this for food. The winter wheat harvest is not adequate to meet consumption requirements estimated at 398,000 MT per year. The harvest would only cover consumption requirements for five months to the end of February 2003 at normal consumption rates or to mid April 2003 at the current rationing levels where only 75 percent of the wheat requirements are being allocated to millers. Even with the rationing, wheat imports of about 200,000 MT are required to meet consumption requirements before the next harvest comes into the market at the start of October 2003.

The winter maize crop only realized about 8,000 MT and was barely adequate to go round the country with most of it being allocated within districts in Masvingo Province. The crop was negligible as a contribution to national cereal availability.


### III-C. Levels of Food Imports

A total of 788,389 MT of maize were reported to have been imported into the country between April 1<sup>st</sup> and the end of November 2002, of which about 650,000 MT is commercial imports, 98,096 MT of WFP and 10,293 MT of NGO maize food aid imports and the remainder food from the private sector. The maize imports reported to have been received by the end of November should have met 72 percent of the normal national consumption requirements for the period. A total of 50,000 MT of wheat imports by Government are expected by the end of the marketing year of which



30,000 MT has already been received in the country. The planned wheat imports fall far short of requirements until the next harvest in October 2002.

A total of 637,727 MT of cereal are planned to be imported into the country, comprised of 361,219 MT of commercial imports, 200,000 MT from WFP pledges, 30,000 MT from C-SAFE (CRS, CARE and WVI), and about 46,508 MT from various NGO pipelines. The outstanding planned imports, if actually distributed to communities, would meet 92 percent of the food requirements for December through to March 2003.



### III-D. The Food Needs for December through March 2003

Food security for the remaining period (December 2002 to March 2003) could be critical as the amount committed to be imported may not be moved into the country before end of March 2003 due to the constraints listed below. Based on the currently used national population estimate of 13.7 million, the human cereal consumption requirement is 744,576 MT for the four months from December through March. Given estimated in-country stocks as of December 1<sup>st</sup> of 50,000 MT and all planned imports from GMB and international food aid (GMB 361,219; WFP 200,000; CSAFE 30,000; NGOs 46,508), there should be a modest deficit of 56,849 MT (7.6% of the total requirement). Planned imports, however, may differ from actual imports, and Table 2.2 illustrates another possible scenario that could lead to a deficit in the same time period of 222,068 MT (30% of the total requirement).

A number of factors could potentially disrupt planned imports:

- Part of the maize for WFP and NGOs could be genetically modified (GM) and hence its movement will depend on Government policy on the GM issue, as other previous GM imports have faced problems.
- The transport network during the rainfall season may not cope with the volume of traffic.
- Availability of foreign currency on part of Government could limit imports
- Logistical and foreign currency constraints may mean the Government could only import 196,000 MT, which is consistent with recent import rates of 14,000 MT per week.

- e) The current nation-wide fuel shortage is also likely to disrupt timely distributions of food throughout the country.

Table 3.3 also uses the same import scenarios based on the new census data that was unofficially reported in the government newspaper of 11.6 million. Using these population figures, the planned imports would actually lead to a 56,452 MT surplus, but the possible scenario of reduced GMB imports would again lead to a deficit of 108,767 MT. Until official release of the new census figure, however, the ZimVAC continues to base its analysis on the previous census projections for 2002.

**Table 3.3: Human Cereal Requirements and Imports Balance for December through March <sup>3</sup>**

	CSO Unofficial Reported Population (11.6 mil)		Estimated Mid Year Censal Pop (13.7 mil)	
	Possible*	Planned **	Possible*	Planned **
Four Months Human Consumption Requirements	631,275	631,275	744,576	744,576
Anticipated in country stocks (Est.)	50,000	50,000	50,000	50,000
GMB Planned Imports	196,000	361,219	196,000	361,219
Food Aid Planned Imports	276,508	276,508	276,508	276,508
<b>Balance</b>	<b>-108,767</b>	<b>56,452</b>	<b>-222,068</b>	<b>-56,849</b>

**Note:**

\*\* Planned refers to human consumption for the remaining period considering all committed imports are moved into the country by mid March 2003

\* Possible refers to the potential maize available into the country considering current rates of imports and the problems being faced by the, Government, NGOs and WFP in importing maize.


### III-E. Macro Economic and Policy Trends

Major macro economic indices show severe negative trends that affect both the government's ability to respond to the current food crisis (through, for example, forex shortages), as well as people's ability to access basic foodstuffs and other commodities. In November, the combined annual inflation rate based on the consumer price index (CPI) was 144%--an increase of 9% over the inflation rate in August (135%). Food inflation was significantly higher at 180%. At community level, price increases for some basic foodstuffs far outstrips even that rate, however, as is discussed further below.

Concurrent with accelerated inflation rates is the parallel exchange rate to the Zim dollar. While the official exchange rate remains at 55 Zim dollars to 1 USD, the parallel exchange rate prevailed at 1500 Zim to 1 USD in November, an increase of 127% since August. In an effort to curb the parallel market, the Government of Zimbabwe announced the closure and crackdown on bureaux de changes in the release of the 2003 National Budget in November. While this policy has been implemented to some degree, the informal traders continue largely unabated. The graph below illustrates the dramatic increases in both CPI inflation and parallel exchange rates.

<sup>3</sup> The population of Zimbabwe has been estimated at 13.7 million based on the CSO inter census data projected from 1992. However, in 2001/02 the CSO conducted yet another census and preliminary unofficial results have put the Zimbabwe population in country at 11.6 million people.

Figure 3.1 Historic CPI Inflation and Exchange Rates



The 2003 National Budget also noted that real GDP is expected to fall by 12% in 2002, and a further 7.2% in 2003. The budget deficit is projected at 17.8% of GDP for 2002, and 11.5% of GDP in 2003. These estimates are based on the assumption that current rates of inflation of 144% will decrease to 96% in 2003. IMF and local economic analysts, however, are forecasting inflation rates of greater than 500% in 2003.

Following the release of the national budget, the government also announced price controls on many basic commodities including: salt, oil, sugar, bread, fuel, milk, beef, wheat flour, yarn, and soaps. The likely effect of these price controls will be increased shortages as traders lose incentive to make forward investments, and, ultimately, rampant price increases for these commodities on the black market.

The fuel supply situation in the country is precarious, with long queues of vehicles evident in front of petrol stations. While the official price of fuel is roughly 75 Zim dollars per litre, the black market price can reach as high as 1,000 Zim dollars per litre. Besides the lost production time of waiting for hours in petrol lines, the fuel shortages reverberate throughout the economy, restricting mobility, increasing transport costs and ultimately affecting the availability and prices of commodities.

## IV. Sub-National Level Food Security

### IV-A. Cereal Availability

The community focus group interviews examined the delivery of food from the GMB (for purchase), general food aid (from WFP and NGOs), and supplementary feeding for under 5s (from the Ministry of Health, NGOs and UNICEF). Discussions first focused on the availability of a variety of foodstuffs from sources other than food aid.

**Table 4.1: Availability of Basic Commodities, Excluding Food Aid**

<b>Commodity</b>	<b>Readily Available</b>	<b>Occasionally Available</b>	<b>Not or Rarely Available</b>	<b>Most Common Source</b>
Cereal Grains	0%	59%	41%	GMB
Maize Meal	0%	23%	77%	Local Shops
Bread/ Flour	0%	31%	69%	Local Shops
Vegetables	28%	28%	44%	Own Production
Groundnuts	0%	0%	100%	Local Shops
Beans	5%	14%	81%	Local Shops
Oil	30%	30%	40%	Local Shops
Salt	30%	42%	28%	Local Shops
Sugar	0%	53%	47%	Local Shops

The availability table above is indicative of the extent of shortages of most basic commodities in the country. Only vegetables, oil and salt are readily available to any significant extent. Groundnuts and beans are rarely or not available, which raises concern regarding protein intake. Staples like maize meal and bread/ flour are largely unavailable, while maize grain is occasionally or rarely available, mostly from the GMB.

Since August, when similar data was collected, there has been little change in the availability of maize meal, salt and sugar. Vegetables are substantially less available than in August, with reduced water supply being cited as one reason for this. Oil is more available, mainly in the form of imported and/ or different varieties that are exempt from price controls.

There is a slight improvement in the frequency at which grain is available, with 59% of communities reporting it to be occasionally available compared to 35% in August. However, additional data suggests that while people may get grain slightly more frequently, the quantities are far from sufficient. 91.5% of communities reported that GMB deliveries to their areas were inadequate. Of the 5 sites that reported the deliveries to be adequate, 3 are resettlement areas, 1 is the only GMB depot for that district (Nabusenga in Binga), and the 5<sup>th</sup> is in Chiredzi district.

At the sub-national level, the greatest problems of grain availability were reported in Manicaland and Mashonaland West, and to a slightly lesser extent in Matabeleland North and Masvingo. Mashonaland East and Central, Midlands and Matabeleland North reported grain as mostly being "occasionally available". Maize meal was rarely found anywhere, though the availability appeared to be best in Matabeleland South and Midlands provinces. The greatest shortages of bread and flour were reported in Matabeleland North and South, and in Mashonaland Central. It should be noted, however, that such differences relate to the extent of the shortages; in no area can the availability of these basic commodities be considered to be satisfactory.


Information was gathered on the number of deliveries of GMB food for purchase and WFP/ NGO food aid between September and the start of December (3 months), and on the provision of supplementary feeding for under-5s.

**Table 4.2 Community-Reported Number of Food Deliveries Since September 2002, & Supplementary Feeding Coverage**

Province	Number of GMB Deliveries	Number of Food Aid Deliveries	Total Number of Food Deliveries	% Under 5s Receiving Supplementary Feeding
Manicaland	2.11	1.10	3.21	10%
Mashonaland Central	1.83	1.17	3.00	35%
Mashonaland East	1.25	.50	1.75	25%
Mashonaland West	1.60	1.25	2.85	33%
Masvingo	1.60	2.00	3.60	70%
Matabeleland North	1.20	1.00	2.20	77%
Matabeleland South	1.60	1.40	3.00	60%
Midlands	1.20	0.75	1.95	60%
<b>Average</b>	<b>1.54</b>	<b>1.18</b>	<b>2.72</b>	<b>49%</b>

Estimates of the numbers of households receiving and the quantities received per household were given. Converting this into an estimate of the amount of households' grain needs that have been met over the period from September to the start of December from WFP/ NGO food aid (maize only) and from the GMB, the provincial picture appears below.

**Maize from GMB and Food Aid as a % of Total Requirements, September-December 2002**



Clearly, grain from these two sources is not covering households' requirements. This is not to say, however, that food needs are not necessarily being covered, but rather that the two sources of food that might be expected to be highly significant are only providing for approximately 40% of needs. In those areas where food aid is being provided, it appears to be a more substantial and regular source of food than the GMB. Whereas GMB deliveries typically were reported to provide perhaps one 50kg sack of maize per one or two households every 2-3 months, aid deliveries typically provided 10-13kg of maize per person per month. It should be stressed that the graph above does not take into account grain that may be accessed from retailers or from the black market, while in the August assessment households indicated that they also expected to get on average between 5% and 15% of their needs from their little remaining food stocks, and from direct sources of food (kinship transfers, barter and payment in-kind). Furthermore, the graph does not take into account the contribution of other foods – including wild foods - to dietary intake. Across the country, communities reported high dependence on wild foods during these times of food scarcity.

Within that provincial picture, availability seems to be worst in Gokwe and parts of Lupane, Nkayi and Binga, in parts of Beitbridge, in the communal areas around Gutu, Chikomba, Chirumanzu and Shurugwi, and across most of the traditionally food secure prime agricultural parts of the Mashonaland and Manicaland provinces. The best situation was in communities in Kariba and Hwange that had received regular large-scale food aid distribution (where 75-80% of needs were met), and in the northern Zambezi Valley, and in the middleveld and highveld areas of the Matabeleland provinces. The differences between areas are quite closely linked to the presence of aid agencies rather than to the extent of needs identified previously: traditionally food insecure areas where agencies were quick to establish food aid programmes are now the best served. The exceptions to this were Binga and Insiza districts, where food aid distributions had been suspended during all or part of the period covered by this assessment.

For supplementary feeding, there is a marked divergence between the north and east of the country, where little supplementary feeding has taken place, and the southern and western half of the country where rates of feeding are from 60-77% of under-5s.

#### IV-B. Cereal Prices

The price of grain is particularly crucial to food access in Zimbabwe at present. In the August assessment, the poor harvests in rural areas resulted in the population in all except 2 of the 22 food economy zones assessed being found to rely on market purchases to get over 70% of their food until April 2003. 7 of the FEZs were relying on market purchase to access over 90% of their food. Furthermore, the poorest wealth groups are most reliant on market purchases, while the better off groups tended at that time to have some food stocks from their harvests.

The most obvious development since August in relation to cereal prices is the 167% increase in the uncontrolled price of maize, while the controlled price remained almost unchanged. This has further and rapidly increased the divergence between the controlled price of grain sold by or through the GMB, and the prices on local markets. Table 3.3 shows the average prices for August and December per Food Economy Zone for the two most common units of sale – a 50kg bag from the GMB, and a 20kg bucket from local markets – and the percentage change in prices.


**Table 4.3: Changes in Cereal Prices, August – December, 2002**

FEZ Name	GMB Maize 50kg (Z\$)			Local Maize 20kg (Z\$)		
	Aug	Dec	% Change	Aug	Dec	% Change
<i>Siabuwa-Nebiri</i>	555	580	5%	n/a	n/a	n/a
<i>Ndowoyo Communal</i>	n/a	580	n/a	n/a	2,500	n/a
<i>Chipinge, Save, E. Chiredzi</i>	1000	800	-20%	1,250	2,800	124%
<i>Beitbridge Lowveld Communal</i>	800	540	-33%	1,000	2,275	128%
<i>Mwenezi, S. Mberengwa, C. Chivi</i>	805	583	-28%	1,375	2,000	45%
<i>W. Kalahari Sandveld</i>	555	580	5%	1,000	n/a	n/a
<i>Ex-Commercial Ranching Resttlement</i>	585	617	5%	1,150	1,500	30%
<i>Poor Resource Kariba Valley</i>	1,100	600	-45%	1,800	1,400	-22%
<i>Kariangwe-Jambezi</i>	675	790	17%	1,500	n/a	n/a
<i>Greater N. Gokwe</i>	555	765	38%	983	4,000	307%
<i>N. Zambezi Valley</i>	555	580	5%	800	2,500	213%
<i>Lusulu, N. Lupane</i>	554	637	15%	1,083	3,125	189%
<i>E. Kalahari Sandveld</i>	570	587	3%	1,500	2,100	40%
<i>Mat. Middleveld &amp; Highveld</i>	558	590	6%	1,250	1,500	20%
<i>Mutare Masvingo Middleveld</i>	693	590	-15%	1,088	1,933	78%
<i>Gr. Zim &amp; Bikita Semi-Intensive</i>	928	648	-30%	625	2,400	284%
<i>C&amp;N Semi-Intensive Middleveld</i>	567	615	8%	744	3,933	429%
<i>Greater Mudzi</i>	566	630	11%	1,000	3,000	200%

<b>Mash. Prime Communal</b>	587	628	7%	800	2,833	254%
<b>Mashonaland Resttlement</b>	560	598	7%	699	2,750	293%
<b>E. Highlands Communal</b>	778	580	-25%	950	n/a	n/a
<b>Eastern Highlands Resettlement</b>	598	580	-3%	1,000	2,000	100%
<b>Average</b>	<b>627</b>	<b>622</b>	<b>-1%</b>	<b>973</b>	<b>2,601</b>	<b>167%</b>

The greatest increases in the uncontrolled prices occurred throughout Mashonaland West, Central and East, and in the western and central parts of Midlands province. The lowest increases in local maize prices appear to coincide with some of the areas that have been best served with food aid in recent months, i.e. much of Matabeleland, southern Masvingo and the western Zambezi Valley. Generally, GMB prices have remained largely unchanged since August. There are local variations in the controlled price that are usually associated with transport costs. More remote areas tend to have a premium added to the basic cost to account for transport. Hence the highest prices for GMB grain are to be found in the extreme south-east of the country, and in parts of the western Zambezi Valley and northern Gokwe.

Converting the price into common units, the average national GMB price translates to Z\$12.44 per kg, while the uncontrolled price has risen to Z\$130.05 per kg. This compares to Z\$12.54 and Z\$48.65 respectively for August. Hence the black market premium for maize has increased from 388% to 1,045%, reflecting the increased shortages of grain referred to earlier. This black market premium also creates significant financial incentive for mis-appropriation of GMB supplies. The graph below illustrates the maize price variations based on different combinations of pricing structures and exchange rates.



#### IV-C. Household Level Access to Cereals

##### **Income**

There are substantial differences in the ways households earn income across wealth groups and across geographical areas. From data collected in the August assessment, we can make some generalisations.

Nationally, casual labouring is by far the most important source of income (26% of all reported income), and its importance is greater for poorer households. Income from crop sales (food and cash crops), market gardening, formal employment, remittances, livestock sales and petty trade each account for 8-12% of total income. Of these, livestock sales and income from formal employment are more important for the better off group, while vegetables sales and petty trade are

more important for the poorer groups. Income from remittances and crop sales display little relationship to wealth.

### **Livestock**

Livestock sales are a more important source of income in southern, western and extreme north-eastern parts of the country. For poorer groups, the income comes mainly from smaller livestock such as chickens and goats, while cattle become more important for the better off. In the agriculturally richer parts of the Mashonaland provinces and Manicaland, livestock are a less important source of regular income.

The nominal prices of livestock of all types have increased since August in almost all areas. The average nominal prices for various animals in August and December are illustrated below.

**Table 4.4 Changes in the Average Nominal Prices of Livestock, August - December**

<b>Animal Type</b>	<b>August</b>	<b>December</b>	<b>% Change</b>
<b>Cattle</b>	Z\$ 22,946	Z\$ 33,652	47%
<b>Goat</b>	Z\$ 2,590	Z\$ 4,457	72%
<b>Chicken</b>	Z\$ 570	Z\$ 801	40%

Although in typical situations of food shortages in rural communities we expect to see livestock prices decline, in Zimbabwe livestock prices – like almost all other prices - are nominally increasing. However, to understand the real value of an animal it is necessary to indicate the terms of trade between livestock and grain, i.e. the quantity of grain that could be purchased with the cash from the sale of an animal. Using this indicator we clearly see the expected pattern of declining real value of livestock. Given that quotas are imposed on the quantity of grain that any individual can purchase from the GMB, the terms of trade below are based on the local uncontrolled price of maize. Thus, both livestock and cereal prices are increasing, but cereal rates of increase far outpace that of livestock, leading to a severely declining terms of trade for small holder farmers.

**Table 4.5 Changes in the Average Value of Livestock in terms of Maize Purchasable at Uncontrolled Prices, August - December**

<b>Animal Type</b>	<b>August</b>	<b>December</b>	<b>% Change</b>
<b>Cattle</b>	472 kg	259 kg	-45%
<b>Goat</b>	53 kg	34 kg	-36%
<b>Chicken</b>	12 kg	6 kg	-47%

It is clear therefore that the real value of livestock has declined significantly since August. It is also worth noting that in a normal year, the national average market value of selling one cow can purchase roughly 717kg of maize<sup>4</sup>. For cattle, the greatest declines in the terms of trade were seen in the northern Zambezi Valley, northern Gokwe, and in the south-east from Beitbridge across Chiredzi and up to Bikita. However the terms of trade were already very low also in southern Masvingo and the western Zambezi Valley (Hwange, Binga, and Kariba). The highest terms of trade are to be found in a belt running across northern Matabeleland and southern Midlands, from Lupane to Zvishavane and Mberengwa. A similar pattern exists for other types of livestock.

Throughout the country, with the exception of parts of Masvingo, livestock sales were widely reported to have increased, especially for cattle and goats. In 100% of the cases, the main reason for selling livestock was to earn money for food. Where sales had decreased, communities often said that this was because they had already sold off most of their livestock and were left with little to sell.

<sup>4</sup> Derived from Earl & Moseley (1996)



Livestock deaths were reportedly higher than normal in 65% of communities, with the main cause of death being almost equally split between drought and disease. Disease was said to be the main cause mainly in the area around Gutu, Buhera and Chikomba districts, and some parts of Matabeleland North (southern Lupane and Nkayi districts). Drought was cited as the main cause in the extreme north and north-east of the country, in Gokwe, northern Lupane and around Tsholotsho and Bulilimangwe. In other parts of the country the causes of death were more mixed.

### **Casual Labour**

Casual labouring – mainly agricultural piecework – is the most important source of income for the poorest wealth groups in almost every part of the country, with only a marginal increase in relative importance in southern areas. The households most vulnerable to food insecurity are particularly vulnerable to anything that affects their ability to get casual employment.

A decline in the availability of labouring opportunities compared to the same period last year was reported by 90% of the communities visited. Of the 5 communities where an increase in opportunities was reported, 3 were in resettlement areas. As much of this employment would be for agricultural work, the combination of drought last year and the related difficulties faced even by relatively better off farmers, and the closure of many commercial farms would explain the drop in the availability of this important source of income. Conversely, but predictably, the number of people seeking such employment increased across most of the country. The number seeking work in the Tsholotsho and Bulilimangwe area and in former commercial ranching areas declined notably, though possibly this may reflect a perception of a lack of work opportunities. One aspect of this that was not captured in this assessment, but has been reported elsewhere, is that often this increase in the numbers seeking work includes additional family members (especially women and children), who would not ordinarily engage in this type of activity to such an extent. Overall, considering both the supply of and demand for labour, 95% of communities believed that getting casual employment this year was more difficult than last year.

For those who do get work, another problem is that although nominal wage rates have increased, the real value of those wages in terms of the amount of maize that could be purchased with them has declined substantially since August. It was not possible to get a comprehensive data-set on this across the country, as in many areas there was said to be no work available and therefore no wage rates were quoted. Furthermore, the types of activity being undertaken in August were not reported, and it was not always clear if the wage rates were directly comparable over time. The changes in the median wage rate is considered more accurate than the mean rate as the latter is skewed by some questionable outlying data.

**Table 4.6: Changes in the Value of 1 Day's Labour in terms of the Grain Purchasable from Wages**

<b>Casual Labour</b>	<b>August</b>	<b>December</b>	<b>% Change</b>
<b>Median Daily Payment Rate</b>	5.1 kg	2.5 kg	-51%

Currently, at the median payment rate (which is nominally at around Z\$300), one day's work would only be adequate to feed an average family for slightly more than one day. This has serious potential implications for production, as typically during the cultivation season poorer households would divide their time between working on their own fields, and working for others' to feed themselves. If they have to work full-time to feed themselves then their own fields could go neglected as a result.

### **Formal Employment & Remittances**

Job losses were reported in 72% of communities, while remittance flows were said to have declined in 96% of communities. The highest ranked areas from which people had lost their jobs were commercial farms and large urban centres such as Harare and Bulawayo.

**Table 4.7: Job Losses since September by Location**

Area of Former Employment	Top Ranked Locations from Which Jobs were Lost
Commercial Farms	31.8%
Large Urban Centre (cities)	25.0%
Local Formal Employment	20.5%
Small Urban Centre	15.9%
Other Rural Areas	0%
Other (esp. safari/ tourism)	6.8%
<b>Total % communities reporting job losses</b>	<b>72%</b>

Most of the job losses in Mashonaland Central and East were from commercial farms, while in Midlands and Masvingo they were from large urban centres, and in Matabeleland North (especially Hwange and Binga districts) they were from tourism-related activities.

### **Government Public Works**

The government operates a public works programme across most of the country, by which people are employed and paid cash which is intended to be used to purchase food. (The programme is technically not a food-for-work programme, though is commonly referred to as such.) 85% of communities reported that public works programmes had been operating in their areas in the period since September. On average across the country, 41% of people were employed on these programmes, with an additional 12% of people receiving payment without working due to their vulnerable status (i.e. the elderly, disabled, chronically ill, etc.). The greatest concentrations of participants in public works were found in Mashonaland East and West, Matabeleland North and Midlands provinces. However, the payments received averaged only Z\$1,145 per household over the 4 months, compared to the maximum official level of Z\$1,500 per month. In most areas there were complaints about late payment of moneys due under the programme, while the widespread unavailability of grain – especially at GMB prices – meant that the cash was of limited value as a means of improving food security.

### **Other Sources of Income**

91% of communities nationwide indicated that people were engaging in income-generating activities that they would not normally pursue. Among those were relatively benign activities such as selling wild fruits and insects, and things like vegetable sales, livestock sales and casual labouring by people who would not normally need to do them. However, what was most striking was the extremely widespread reporting of illegal and high-risk activities. The five most commonly cited activities reported by mixed groups and by women only were as follows.

**Table 4.8: “Unusual” Income-Generating Activities Reported by Focus Groups to be Undertaken**

Activity	Mixed Group	Women Only Group
Gold Panning	38%	36%
Theft (esp. livestock)	26%	38%
Prostitution	25%	30%
Sale of Household Assets	13%	7%
Wild Food Sales	10%	15%

### **Social Access**

Communities were asked whether female-headed households, child-headed households and chronically-ill headed households faced any particular difficulties in accessing food aid. Both the mixed- and women-only focus groups said in 70-80% of the interviews that all of those groups did face particular difficulties. The main problems – largely related to social and/ or economic marginalisation - were:

- Multiple responsibilities: the lack of time to seek food, engage in income-earning activities and care for children, elderly and/ or the sick
- The lack of physical strength to engage in many income-generating activities
- Their relative lack of strength in situations of “first-come, first-served”, and/ or their lack of mobility preventing them from getting to distribution or selling points
- The lack of representation, especially for children and the chronically ill, meaning that they may not get registered for food aid or for GMB food

The same problems are likely to be faced by the elderly and disabled, who were also regularly listed as being among the most vulnerable in the community. In many of the cases where any of those groups were reported not to face difficulties, the reason given was that they are already given priority in food aid distributions. Large families – including those caring for orphans - were also often mentioned as being among the most vulnerable, and this could be attributed mainly to the high dependency ratios in such families.

The methodology of this assessment, using mainly interviews with community leaders, did not facilitate the examination of the issue of politicisation of food access. Questions were asked about who made the decision regarding the rationing of access to GMB food. The Councillor was reportedly involved in 15% of communities, the Chief or traditional authorities in 49%, the community in general in 29%, and “others” in 14%. Queuing or “first-come, first-served” was used in 21% of communities. Most commonly, a register was compiled for the community, and households were allowed to purchase from the available GMB supplies on a rotational basis. In some cases, the authorities collected money in advance for the purchase of the grain. The main complaints reported referred to the inadequacy of supplies, or to the biases that arise from queuing. For food aid from WFP and NGOs, most complaints were about the inadequacy of supplies. Not all of those considered vulnerable were able to receive rations, while others felt that some selection criteria were unfair (e.g. having a relative in formal employment, irrespective of their wage rate and ability to send remittances).

#### **IV-D. Substitution of Other Commodities for Maize**

In all areas the shortage of cereals has resulted in people substituting other foodstuffs for their meals. The most notable pattern was the lack of substitution of other cereals, such as wheat/ bread, rice or potatoes for maize. In spite of the recent wheat harvest, wheat consumption was found to be significant only in parts of Mashonaland Central, especially on resettled farms. Elsewhere, wheat and flour were generally reported to be not or rarely available. For other commodities such as rice and potatoes, it is likely that the high prices prevent most people from consuming them. Respondents in northern Manicaland, and parts of Mashonaland East and Central were the only groups to report the consumption of wheat/ bread and rice.

The most common substitutes were wild foods. The types and availability of wild foods varies significantly across the country and over time, as the availability of these foods is very seasonal. Roots, leaves, fruits and insects are all consumed in a number of different ways. In some areas, such as the Zambezi Valley, hunting and fishing are also undertaken. Over 84% of communities reported that the consumption of wild foods had increased compared to last year, while 80% also reported that people were consuming types of wild foods that they would not normally consume. Amongst these were poisonous foods that require long and careful preparation. Many respondents linked such foods to stomach problems, with 70% of women reporting that diarrhoea had increased among children. Although not verified by the assessment teams, a number of deaths were also reported as a result of consuming foods that had been incorrectly prepared.

It was not possible in this assessment to quantify the value of wild foods to nutritional intake. However the 1996 RiskMap survey found that wild foods contributed on average 5-15% of total energy requirements, with significantly higher figures for the western Zambezi Valley, and higher figures in all areas for the poorer groups compared to the better off. Wild foods are likely to be

important also for many micro-nutrients which may be lacking in otherwise undiversified diets at the moment.

Another practice common in some areas, especially in parts of Manicaland and Masvingo was the boiling of fruits such as bananas and paw paws to serve as the main meal, while mangoes were also commonly cited as a main meal. Many meals now seem to be consumed without any staple, and meals involving just tea and/ or vegetables were widely reported.

#### IV-E. Coping Strategies

The August assessment provided information on the percentage of households engaged in a variety of coping strategies related to consumption patterns, expenditure patterns, income strategies and migration strategies. A summary of the national data from August is reproduced below.

**Table 4.9: Percentage of Households Engaged in Selected Coping Strategies, August 2002**

CONSUMPTION STRATEGIES		INCOME STRATEGIES	
Borrow food	57	Sell all poultry	11
Purchase food on credit	21	Sell all goats	8
Food from relatives or friends	28	Sell breeding and draft power cattle	6
Regularly limit size of portions	86	Sell land, or gave up rights to land	1
Regularly reduce # of meals per day	86	Sell other assets	9
Skip whole days without eating	49	MIGRATION STRATEGIES	
EXPENDITURE STRATEGIES		Take children out of school	18
Reduce expenditure on health care	42	Send children away to friends or relatives	7
Reduce expenditure on education	39	Forced to migrate to find work or food	12
Reduce expenditure on beer and	34	Thinking about permanent migrations?	9

Although the degree of coping varied by indicator, generally it appeared that the Western Zambezi Valley, northern Matabeleland South, eastern Matabeleland North, and Mashonaland prime communal areas were engaging in fewer coping strategies than average. However, it is important to recognise that a lack of coping could be due either to a better underlying situation, or due to the provision of adequate amounts of food aid. Northern parts of Matabeleland South and the western Zambezi Valley were among the first parts of the country to have received substantial amounts of food aid.

The data reported above on the availability of maize and the substitution of other foods (especially wild foods) suggests that reduced consumption is still a necessary and important coping strategy.

Nationally, 87% of communities reported that there had been an increase in school drop-outs in their area, with the average drop-out rate being estimated at 24% of all school-children. Hunger, inability to pay fees and associated costs, and the need for children to assist in the search for food were cited as the main reasons for the decline in attendance. It was notable that more than half of those communities who reported no decrease in attendance attributed this to the provision of supplementary feeding in those areas. The highest drop-out rates were reported in Mashonaland East & West and Midlands provinces (33-37%), while the lowest rates were in Matabeleland North & South (13-14%).

The assessment produced useful information on population movements. 27% of communities reported net movements into their areas, and 28% reported movements out. 45% reported no change. The Mashonaland and Eastern Highlands Resettlement zones reported the greatest movements in. This was attributed by communities to the land reform programme, and a wide variety of communal areas reported people moving out of their areas for the same reason. The Highveld (Mashonaland) Prime Communal zone reported movements into the area due to people searching for food, and corresponding movements out were reported from the western Zambezi Valley, and districts between Gokwe and Lupane. Other areas with reported net movements into the area, which were attributed to land reform (i.e. movement of former commercial farm workers) were the Highveld Communal areas, northern Zambezi Valley, and Greater Mudzi. No corresponding movements out were reported, however no former commercial farm workers were interviewed for this assessment. A variety of areas reported people moving out in search of employment, though nowhere reported movements in for the same reason, which suggests that this may represent emigration.

## V. Targeting

### *Changes since August*

The December assessment was not intended to provide revised numbers of people in need of food aid in Zimbabwe. Based on the information gathered in the community-level interviews, it is possible to indicate trends in food security in communal and resettlement areas. However, a worsening of the situation was anticipated in August and this was reflected in the increased numbers in need of aid anticipated for December (from roughly 4.5 million people to 6.7 million). Therefore the ZimVAC recommends the use of the same figures for those communities.

However, for the numbers of former commercial farm workers in need of assistance is estimated to have increased since August, due to the increase in the farm tenure transitions farms since August. Precise data on the numbers in need may only be gathered in an upcoming survey by UNDP and the Ministry of Social Welfare. In the interim, the ZimVAC believes it is necessary to make some attempt to include those additional former farm workers in the numbers in need. With approximately a further 45% of all commercial farms changing tenure since August in the land reform programme, it is estimated that an additional 551,000 workers and their family members have been affected. In absence of a comprehensive assessment, estimating that 20% of those former workers may be re-employed by newly resettled farmers this year, leads to an additional estimated number of people in need of 496,000 from August. This is reflected in the new totals presented below.

**Table 5.1. Population in Need of Emergency Food Aid and Cereal Requirement**

	<b>DECEMBER 2002 VAC ESTIMATE</b>		
	<b>MAX # PEOPLE IN NEED</b>	<b>MAX % TOTAL POPULATION IN NEED</b>	<b>CUMULATIVE MT CEREAL FOOD AID</b>
<b>SEPT 1-NOV 30</b>	4,496,000	33	162,000
<b>DEC 1-MAR 31</b>	7,182,000	52	345,000
SEPT-MAR	<b>7,182,000</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>507,000</b>

### **Geographical Targeting**

The August assessment found that food insecurity was very widespread across Zimbabwe. Re-analysis of the data showed that in all parts of the country, the extent of the food gap for those who had any gap (in other words, assuming that one person's surplus does not necessarily compensate for another's deficit) was almost entirely within a relatively narrow range of 46-62% of

requirements. The “breadth” of food insecurity – i.e. the percentage of the population with a deficit – ranged mainly from 75% to 100%. Therefore, there is nowhere in the country that can do without food aid. Targeting in such circumstances must be about the proportion of the population to be fed and the ration rates or frequency of distributions, rather than a simple geographical “yes or no” decision.

The data collected in this assessment suggests that food security has worsened countrywide since August. There are inadequate supplies of food, prices continue to rise at a very rapid rate, while the value of labour and assets have declined in most areas relative to the cost of food. Furthermore, as was indicated in section 2, the prospects for an improvement in the food supply situation over the coming months do not appear to be good.


Geographical differences, therefore, relate only to the relative extent of the worsening of food insecurity. Data on relative changes in 4 key indicators were used to cluster food economy zones according to the extent of the deterioration of the situation since August. The 4 indicators were % of food requirements met by the GMB and food aid combined, and the changes in the uncontrolled price of 20kg of maize, of cattle/maize terms of trade and of casual labour/maize terms of trade. Table 5.2 and the following map indicate which FEZs (with the districts they comprise) have witnessed the greatest and smallest declines since September. Note that the zones are not ranked within any given group.

**Table 5.2: Extent of Deterioration of Food Security Indicators by Food Economy Zone**

<b><u>Situation has Worsened the Most in:</u></b>	<b><u>Districts Affected:</u></b>
Greater Northern Gokwe	Gokwe North & South, SW Hurungwe, SW Makonde, N. Kariba
Highveld Prime Communal Mashonaland Resettlement	Hurungwe, Makonde, Zvimba, Kadoma, Chegutu, Mazowe Centenary, Bindura, Shamva, Goromonzi, Seke, Marondera, Makoni, Murehwa, S. UMP ( <i>communal and resettlement areas respectively</i> )
Great Zimbabwe & Bikita Semi-Intensive Communal	N. Bikita, N. Masvingo
Central & Northern Semi-Intensive Middleveld	Chikomba, Gutu, Chirumhanzu, Shurugwi, small parts of Wedza, Makoni
Lusulu, Northern Lupane	SE Binga, N. Lupane, SE Gokwe, W. Kadoma
Beitbridge Lowveld	Beitbridge, SW Chiredzi, S&C Gwanda, S. Matobo, S. Bulilimamangwe
<b><u>"Average Worsening" of the Situation in:</u></b>	
Kariangwe-Jambezi	parts Binga, Hwange
Northern Zambezi Valley	Lower Guruve, Lower Muzarabani, N. Mt. Darwin
Eastern Highlands Communal	Parts Chipinge, Chimanimani, Mutare, Mutasa, Makoni, Nyanga
<b><u>Situation has Worsened the Least in:</u></b>	
Mwenezi, S. Mberengwa, S. Zvishavane, C. Chivi	SE Mberengwa, N. Mwenenzi, S. Zvishavane, C. Chivi
Matabeleland Middle and Highveld	N. Matobo, N. Gwanda, Umzingwane, S. Insiza, W. Mberengwa
Western Kalahari Sandveld	Tsholotsho, N. Bulilimamangwe
Poor Resource Kariba Valley	S. Kariba, parts Binga, Hwange
Eastern Highlands Resttlement	Ex-commercial farms in Manicaland
Eastern Kalahari Sandveld	S. Lupane, Nkayi, W. Kwekwe, Bubi, Gweru
Mutare-Masvingo Middleveld	S. Buhera, Zaka, S. Bikita, S. Masvingo, S. Chivi, S. Mutare
Greater Mudzi	Mudzi, E. Rushinga, Mutoko, N. Nyanga, N. Makoni
Chipinge, Save, Eastern Chiredzi	Chipinge, E. Chiredzi
Commercial Cattle Ranching Resettlement	All ex-commercial/ Fast-Track areas in Mat. N&S, Midlands, Masvingo

<b>Incomplete Data</b>	
Siabuwa-Nebiri Low-Cotton Producing Communal	Parts Binga & Kariba
Ndowoyo Communal	Part Chipinge

### Distribution of Relative Worsening by Food Economy Zone



The nature of this assessment does not enable re-calculation of the numbers in need of food assistance. However, what can be concluded is that there is certainly a need for an increase in the provision of food on the market, preferably at controlled or subsidised prices. If that food is not provided on the market then food aid will have to be used by communities to meet all food requirements, and the *de facto* need for aid will therefore increase substantially.

### **Social Targeting**

- **Wealth Groups**

Food aid is usually targeted on the basis of the economic and sometimes social ability of various groups to access food. In Zimbabwe, the situation is complicated by the serious physical shortage of basic foodstuffs, meaning that many of those with the economic means to access food cannot do so. Hence they feel aggrieved at typically being excluded from receiving assistance based on the socio-economic criteria of vulnerability typically used by aid agencies. Such groups would best be served through the supply of food to the market, however in the absence of such supplies the validity of socio-economic targeting becomes questionable. A wider spreading of limited aid supplies would then be required. In addition to meeting some food requirements, such an approach would also reduce the competition to be registered, and thereby potentially mitigate the risks of social conflict and corruption in the registration and targeting process.

Communities estimated that 63% of households would be able to afford grain if it was available at controlled/ GMB prices, while 14% could also afford grain if it was available at uncontrolled/ black market prices. While these estimates are far from rigorous, they are indicative of the potential benefits to food security of increasing market supplies in the country.

The information collected for this assessment suggests that no wealth group has escaped the effects of the current crisis. While the better off are more likely to be able to access the little food available on the market, they have also been affected by declining real livestock prices and by declines in the level of formal employment. The poorer groups are worst affected by continuing inflation eroding the value of their incomes. More detailed household-level surveys have consistently found that declining real incomes are affecting the ability of the poor not only to consume adequate amounts of food, but also to access an adequate range of foodstuffs, and to pay for basic services like education and healthcare. The situation continues to worsen for this group as the availability of casual labour and other income-earning activities decline.

- ***Livelihood Types***

Although this assessment focused on communities in communal and new resettlement areas, there are other communities with different livelihood profiles whose situation is considered to be of serious concern.

The situation of former commercial farm workers requires further investigation. A household economy assessment carried out in August found that former farm workers who had been retrenched faced deficits of up to 75% of their food needs, as they were largely unable to find significant new sources of income. 27% of the resettled communities in the current assessment also listed ex-farm workers as being amongst the most vulnerable groups. While some former farm workers have been resettled, some have been employed by new settlers on model A2 farms, and some have moved to communal areas, there are still believed to be substantial numbers living on the farms where they were formerly employed. An assessment of the situation of former farm workers is planned by UNDP and the Ministry of Social Welfare in January, and it is hoped that this will shed further light on their status. In the interim, however, the VAC has indicated an increase in the number of former farm workers requiring assistance based on the increased numbers of farm-tenure transitions and the limited availability of other sources of employment.

Although the situation of resettled farmers has been assessed in a number of farms, the provision of food aid to those areas continues to be limited. It is clear that there are food aid needs among both resettled communities and former commercial farm workers, and it is imperative that the government, donors and humanitarian agencies engage with these groups in the provision of assistance on the basis of need alone.

Urban areas and mining communities are also acknowledged to be vulnerable, though information is particularly lacking on the situation in urban areas. ZimVAC is planning urban assessments for early 2003, but there is also a need for government and humanitarian agencies to become more engaged with these communities.

### ***Social Groups***

Information provided by communities in this assessment regarding the types of people who are most vulnerable was almost entirely consistent with the responses to the same question in August. The most commonly reported vulnerable groups were the elderly, widows/ female-headed households, child-headed households, the disabled, the chronically ill, households caring for orphans, those with large families, and those with few resources. Ex-commercial farm workers were also cited by a number of communities as being vulnerable.



### ***“Hot Spots”***

The Zimbabwe VAC strongly believes that aid resources need to be spread widely across the country: all districts need assistance, albeit at different levels. There is nowhere in the country that could manage without any outside assistance. To use an analogy, there are fires burning across the country. The water available is not adequate to put all of them out, but it would be preferable to spread the water around to try to keep all the fires under control to some extent, rather than trying to completely put out the fires in some areas as others would then burn out of control. Thus, in the case of limited humanitarian resources, a “sprinkler approach” is strongly advocated over a “fire hose approach”.

With that caveat, the data available from this assessment suggests that the areas of greatest immediate concern are in the centre of the country, around northern Lupane, eastern, central and northern Midlands province, southern Mashonaland East and northern Masvingo, and in the extreme south of the country in the lowveld. The remaining communal areas of Matabeleland North and South and Masvingo, however, remain among the worst affected parts of the country though their situation has not deteriorated substantially since August.

## **VI. Relationships Between Food Insecurity and Other Sectors**

### **VI-A. Water and Sanitation**

The assessment of water and sanitation services carried out by the Water and Sanitation Institute and Unicef in May 2002 highlighted a deterioration in community access to these services particularly in the rural areas due to the drought, cyclone - induced floods, a reduction in budgetary allocation and the land reform programme. The newly resettled areas lack adequate infrastructure including safe water and sanitation services. While this scenario has been aggravated by the increased demand for these services due to the HIV/aids pandemic, the current humanitarian crisis has also negatively impacted on sanitation conditions as communities have shifted their attention from rehabilitating damaged structures to spending more time seeking food.

Access to safe water supplies is particularly at risk in all the districts in Matabeleland North, South, Masvingo and in some districts in Midlands, and Mashonaland East and Central. The May 2002 assessment identified orphans, young children, and pregnant women as the groups most vulnerable to a lack of sanitation.

The provision of sanitation supplies should therefore target vulnerable households particularly child-headed households and also institutions such as schools and health centers.

### **VI-B. Education Services**

While poverty and the declining economic environment have negatively impacted on access to quality educational services, the current humanitarian crisis has also taken its toll by increasing the level of absenteeism and school drop-out rates of children of different age groups. This is due to a number of factors such as hunger, inability to pay fees for education, the increasing need for children to be engaged in food and income generating activities. The crisis in the education sector is further compounded by extended illness and deaths of teachers due to HIV/Aids infection. It has been reported that one third of teachers were HIV infected in 2001 with a potential to rise to 40%. Death rates were estimated to be equivalent to 4% of teachers in that year.

Movements out of school due to the land reform program have also resulted in absenteeism and an increased drop-out rate. This situation affects achievement as the children lose out even if they later get back into school again.

Empirical data suggests that school feeding has a positive impact on children and leads to a decrease in drop-out rates, better school results and enhanced enrolment rates.

### VI-C. HIV/AIDS

In Southern Africa, Zimbabwe is the second most affected country by HIV/AIDS, after Swaziland. Estimated national percentage of adult population (15 – 49 years) infected by this disease reaches the alarming rate of 33.4% (38% for Swaziland).

Within the age group of 15 – 19 years the rate of infection for girls is 5 times higher than that for boys.

#### Impact of HIV/Aids on food production

The effects of HIV/ AIDS cut across all parts of the country and all wealth groups. The table below shows the latest available prevalence rates by province.

**Table 6.1: HIV Prevalence Rates by Province (women 15-49 years in ante-natal clinics)**

Province	HIV %
Mashonaland Central	19.1
Mashonaland East	34.7
Mashonaland West	25.6
Midlands	46.2
Masvingo	42.7
Manicaland	17.7
Matabeleland South	33.6
Matabeleland North	28.2

Source: Ministry of Health 2002, based on data from 2000

Food security and HIV/ AIDS have multiple linkages in both directions. HIV/ AIDS reduces food security by requiring that more household expenditure is devoted to healthcare, while at the same time reducing the amount of labour available to households to engage in food- and income-generating activities. Agricultural production in particular can decline as there is less labour available to cultivate, and therefore families either cultivate a smaller area or switch to less-productive and less labour-intensive crops. The household often loses a breadwinner to illness and eventually death, while other household members' time is needed to care for the sick and for dependents such as orphans and elderly people who remain behind. In the other direction, the problems of increasing food insecurity can push people into high-risk activities. Most obviously, as the community survey indicated, some women and girls engage in commercial sex work as a means of earning money. Less obviously, as people may migrate further in search of work there is a greater likelihood of casual sexual relations which can increase the spread of infection.

In Zimbabwe, some food aid programs allocate a special food basket to PLWHA (including children) to answer to their specific nutritional needs. These programs need to be evaluated in order to assess the impacts of this specific food ration distribution.

### VI-D. Nutrition and Health Status

Severe food insecurity, particularly when exacerbated by poor health and sanitation conditions, will ultimately manifest itself as malnutrition. It is therefore essential to monitor changes and nutrition status through out the current emergency. Over time, changes in nutrition status will indicate the severity of the food crisis and the adequacy of the response.

Following the August nutritional assessment it has not been possible to carry out an assessment in December in order to monitor the severity of the crisis.

A health and nutritional rapid assessment is planned for January 2003. It is anticipated that this will highlight the trends of the impact of the food crisis.

Following previous assessments child supplementary feeding programs have been instituted throughout the whole country. Some districts such as Buhera, Gokwe North, Mudzi, Chirumanzu and Mt Darwin have indicated that some children have the supplementary meal as the main meal.

In some districts a number of organizations are unable to provide the full basket and only maize is given. Without fortification, this diet has implications for nutritional deficiencies diseases, particularly pellagra which is a common problem in Zimbabwe.

## **VII. Future Agricultural Production Prospects**

### **VII-A. Climatic Conditions**

#### **Rainfall Performance**

Significant, well-distributed rains, marking the start of the 2002/2003 rainy seasons were received during the last week of October and first week of November (see Annex 2 Rainfall maps). This was, however, followed by a prolonged dry spell, associated with very hot conditions, during the second week of November, restricting the planting of maize and other crops. In most areas the dry conditions persisted for more than 25 days, with the southern districts being the most affected. Beitbridge was dry for 32 consecutive days while most of the northern areas had light to moderate rainfall towards the end of November.


The percentage of mean rainfall indicates large rainfall deficits (<50% of normal rainfall) around Beitbridge and surpluses (>100% of normal rainfall) around Mutare with the bulk of the rainfall having been received at the end of October (Figure 7.1). However, the distribution has been erratic as shown by the total dekadal rainfall graphs for selected rainfall stations (Figure 7.1).

The accumulated rainfall received from the beginning of October to end of November ranges between 19mm and 100mm in most areas (See Cumulative dekadal rainfall Map). The Cumulative dekadal rainfall for Beitbridge, Gweru, Harare Belvedere and Mt Darwin is far below normal as shown in the graphs. However, there was fairly widespread rainfall received during the first week of December. The wet conditions improved the rainfall situation over the eastern half of the country, where the accumulated rainfall from the beginning of October to mid December ranges between 100 to 300mm.

#### **Future Outlook**

The anticipated El Nino event is still expected to manifesting the second part of the growing season, resulting in the probability of below normal rainfall during the time period when the maize crop is maturing. Should this occur, the national maize harvest would be significantly reduced.

Figure 7.1 2002/03 Rainfall maps and graphs for selected rainfall stations



## VII-B. Production Prospects for the 2002/03 Season

The 2002/03 production prospects are gloomy, and below average harvests are likely for most crops. Considering a number of factors listed below, even if an average season is experienced from mid-December onwards, the cereal harvest is likely to be far below national requirements. Production prospects are likely to be hampered by;

- a) The unavailability of inputs (seed, fertilizers and tillage) compared to demand
- b) The slow start to the planting season due to poor rainfall distribution and a serious dry spell from mid-November to early December
- c) The loss of some early-planted crops during the dry spell in November, and the likely limited ability of many farmers to replant due to input unavailability and high costs
- d) The potential El Niño induced drought which could occur in the critical productive stage of the crops
- e) Some of the households being too weak to do effective work in their fields due to food shortages
- f) The land tenure transition on commercial farms is likely to lead to less area planted and reduced yields during this transitional period for both food and cash crops
- g) The effects of HIV/AIDS on the time available to households for productive work, as substantial time is lost tending the ill and attending burials.

These factors have contributed to only about a third of the potential area being planted to crops as at the end of November 2002 (Table 7.1). However, it is normal for significant amounts of planting to be carried out in December, therefore the figures below are not by any means the final figures for the season. The rainfall received in December should facilitate an increase in the area planted provided, although the other factors mentioned above could hinder the extent of this increase. If most of the crops are not planted by end of December, then a good harvest for any crops planted subsequently would be dependent upon the rainfall season extending beyond March 2003. The chances of such a lengthy season are low, given the typical effects of the El Niño phenomenon.

**Table 7.1: Comparison of Area Planted to Crops as of December 2002 to 2001/02 and Average**

Crop	2002/03	2001/02	1994/95	1991/92	1990s Ave	2002/03	2002/03	2002/03	2002/03
	04-Dec-02 Area (Ha)	Area (Ha)	Area (Ha)	Area (Ha)	Area (Ha)	as % of 1990s	as % of 01/02	3 as % of 91/92	as % of 94/95
Maize	498,464	1,317,800	1,397,900	881,000	1,301,440	38	38	57	36
Sorghum	18,955	82,700	130,990	74,100	145,723	13	23	26	14
Rapoko	35,568	67,000	46,560	92,000	71,861	49	53	39	76
Mhunga	24,203	65,250	211,550	108,000	159,770	15	37	22	11
Groundnuts	86,442	259,000	163,500	169,100	177,775	49	33	51	53
Cotton	146,339	398,600	219,000	235,777	260,393	56	37	62	67
Sunflower	995	23,550	139,600	153,400	107,107	1	4	1	1
E/beans	1,555								
Soyabean	835	54,500	71,380	45,100	55,418	2	2	2	1
All Tobacco	21,354	79,170	81,980	86,780	84,661	25	27	25	26
Paprika	7,062	17,400	0				41		
Total	879,366	2,364,970	2,462,460	1,845,257	2,364,148	37	37	48	36

Source: AREX

## VII-C. Inputs Supply for 2002/03 Season

According to the CFU monthly report for November, seed availability this season is 33% higher than normal. The country normally requires around 35 000MT of seed maize. This season, stocks of seed maize have been reported in the range of between 47,000MT and 50,000MT. Seed houses have already sold out all their maize seed, which indicates record sales.

However, the availability of seed maize of such magnitude at the national level does not seem to translate into availability at the local area level. While non-availability of seed at the retail level up to end of September was attributed to traders waiting for an increase in the controlled price of seed, the situation did not significantly improve even after the price review. About 15,000 MT are said to have been sold by seed houses to retailers and dealers between July/August and the price review. According to the Ministry of Lands, Agriculture and Rural Resettlement as of late November 26,500 MT of maize seed has been sold by seed houses to retailers. The government of Zimbabwe ordered 19,500MT of seed maize. NGOs are said to have bought around 5,000MT of maize seed. Despite the record sales at the macro level there are fears that all the seed will not be planted. Of recent there have been isolated reports of consumption of seed due to the current shortage of grain for consumption.

#### **VII-D. Support to Agricultural Recovery**

FAO and several NGOs have provided agricultural input assistance in the form of seeds and fertilizers, to smallholder farmers. As of 30 November 2002, the total number of households that had been earmarked to receive assistance stood at 578,054. Generally, these are vulnerable households with access to land, but who are not able to purchase inputs, e.g. orphan-headed households, widows, etc. The types and quantities of inputs vary by organization but generally the inputs given are sufficient to cultivate between 0.4ha and 1.0 hectare. The types of crops for which seed assistance was given include maize, sorghum, cowpeas, millet, sugar beans and rape. The types of fertilizers given are Compound D and Ammonium Nitrate (AN). Because of shortages of fertilizers locally some NGOs are importing Urea from South Africa. Inadequate seed may compromise the area planted to crops.

Support from FAO and NGOs had a deliberate bias towards early maturing varieties. Given the current food crisis early maturing varieties will help make grain available to households. The early maturing varieties are from all seed house houses. Attention was also given to suitable crop mix. The types of crops included maize, sorghum, sugar beans, cowpeas and millet. Some provided some vegetable seeds such as rape.

#### **VII-E. Government Input Credit Scheme**

Distribution of seed under the GMB Input Credit Scheme is underway. The actual numbers of beneficiaries per district are not yet available from the MLARR. However the total government order of cereal seed was 19,500MT of maize, 450MT of sorghum and millet seed, 80,000 MT of Compound D fertilizer, 50,000 MT of ammonium nitrate fertilizer, agricultural chemicals and tillage facilities to communal and resettlement farmers. Generally there is a shortage of both basal and top dressing fertilizers this year. A total of 600,000 MT of NPK (basal) fertilizer and 420,000 MT of ammonium fertilizer is required for the 2002/03 crop production season, but only about 262,000 MT of NPK and 140,000 MT of AN are likely to be produced between now and March 2002 giving a deficit of 338,000 MT of NPK and 280,000 MT of AN. The types of farmers eligible for the input credit scheme are small-scale commercial farmers, A1 and A2 Resettlement farmers and communal farmers. The level of input support varies per type of farmer. For communal farmers support is up to 2ha, old resettlement farmers 3ha, newly resettled farmers under model A1 5ha, newly resettled farmers under A2 model 20ha, and small-scale commercial farmers 20ha.

#### **VII-F. Community Agricultural Findings**

The results of the community focus group interviews in relation to agriculture show that only 30% of the smallholder farmers have enough maize seed requirements for timely cultivation this season. The equivalent figure for pulses - 3.3% - indicates severe shortages of the seed. The main sources of cereal seeds for smallholder farmers are GMB (47.5%), market outlets (29.5%), NGO/UN (9.8%) and retained seed (4.9%).

Fertilizers (both basal and top dressing) are not available in market outlets. 6.6% of the communities interviewed indicated that they had enough basal fertilizer requirements for the season. Only 2.6% had top dressing fertilizers. The average price per kg of maize seed is Z\$389.80, ranging from Z\$150 to Z\$1540 per kg depending on variety.

With the early rains that came in November, 35.1% of the farmers have already planted some of their crops. However with the dry spell that followed these early rains, the early-planted crop was already being stressed in most areas. About 50.8% of interviewed groups indicated that the total anticipated area planted to cereal crops this season will be smaller than that of last year. A slightly smaller proportion, 45.9%, intend to have as much or greater area under cereals as last year. For pulses most farmers, 70.5%, intend to plant a larger hectareage this season than in the previous year.

The majority, 96.7%, of respondent farmer groups interviewed described the rains received so far this year as poor. The assessment was conducted during the dry spell that followed the initial rains. Most farmers expect to have cereals ready for consumption from February to March.

### **VIII. Recommendations**

- The food situation is expected to be critical from Jan – Mar 2003. Govt. and the humanitarian community will need to act with urgency to avert crisis through both market channels and food aid.
- There is a need for contingency measures for food imports for 2003 to be put in place. Government should reconsider the potential role of the private sector in importing food.
- The discrepancy between reported imports and observed availability of GMB food warrants further investigation.
- The need for humanitarian assistance will continue into 2003/04, hence need to start planning for assistance of potentially equal or greater magnitude than current levels.
- Given the current shortage of top- dressing fertilizer, Govt needs to ensure its availability in the coming months in order to maximize yields.
- There is currently inadequate information on the urban, health and nutritional situation, hence a need to fill these gaps. Nutrition and health assessments are planned with the Ministry of Health.
- The Government and humanitarian community should continue to maintain its focus on HIV/AIDS mitigation during this current food crisis.

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## **Annex 1: VAC Assessment Participants**

### **National VAC List of Participants**

Joyce Chanetsa	Chair – Food and Nutrition Council
Charity Mutohodza	National Early Warning Unit, Ministry of Agriculture
Lameck Betera	Ministry of Local Government – Civil Protection Unit
Elliot Vhurumuku	FEWS-NET
Blessing Butaumocho	FEWS-NET
Nicholas Haan	WFP
Isaac Tarakidzwa	WFP
Morris Mudiwa	FAO
Michael O'Donnell	Save the Children (UK)
Dominique Brunet	Oxfam
Andi Kende	Action Contre la Faim
Bridget Chiwawa	GOAL
Stanley Chitekwe	UNICEF
Judith Mutamba	UNICEF
Albertien van der Wien	WHO
Karine Coudert	IFRC

### **Research Teams**

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Mbala Muzodzi	WFP
Prisca Mhlope	WFP
Vusumuzi Soganile	WFP
Pius Ncube	WFP
Oscar Chimhanzi	WFP
Kudzai Mazumba	WFP
Enate Muzambi	WFP
Rhoda Francis	WFP
Thembekile Dube	WFP


Leo Matunga	ACF
Royal Pfuti	CARE
Mufaro Shoko	CARE
Bridget Chiwawa	GOAL
Blessing Madziyanike	GOAL
Diana Muzengeza	Save the Children (UK)
Tambuzai Tinonetsana	Zimbabwe Red Cross
Blessing Butaumocho	FEWS-NET
Guide Ncube	WorldVision
Garikai Shoniwa	MSF-Holland
Simplisious Shoriwa	CRS

Lameck Betera	Ministry of Local Government – Civil Protection Unit
Emmanuel Makiwa	Ministry of Lands, Agriculture & Rural Resettlement
Mwadzi Magaisa	Ministry of Public Service, Labour & Social Welfare - SDF
Ronald Mubaiwa	Department of Social Welfare
F. Muposhi	AREX
Shack Alibaba	AREX
O. Svubure	AREX
Marshall Shumba	AREX
K. Mariga	AREX
Nyeverwai Gono	AREX
D. Zisengwe	AREX
D. Mpala	AREX
Jacob Nyagweta	AREX




**Annex 2 ZIMBABWE RAINFALL SITUATION AS AT THE END OF NOVEMBER 2002**


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
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
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
**Nov Dekad 1**




**Nov Dekad 2**




**Nov Dekad 3**




**Dec Dekad 1**



**Cummulative**



**% of Mean**



**Annex 3: ZIM VAC NOVEMBER ASSESSMENT: COMMUNITY FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEW FORM**

As a follow up to the August VAC assessment, the VAC committee is looking for updated information on the topics below. Please fill in one questionnaire per selected site. The information can be obtained from key informants in the villages such as village heads, kraal heads, AREX officers, headmasters, community leaders, NGO staff based in those areas and others.

Province \_\_\_\_\_ District \_\_\_\_\_ Ward \_\_\_\_\_

Village \_\_\_\_\_ (FEZ No. \_\_\_\_\_) Land Type: Communal ( ) or Resettlement Area ( )

Population size (households) \_\_\_\_\_ Name of Person Completing Form \_\_\_\_\_

Signature \_\_\_\_\_ Completed on (Date) \_\_\_\_\_

No. of Discussion Participants: Male: \_\_\_\_\_ Female: \_\_\_\_\_

**Food Availability**

1. What has been the availability over the past month of the following commodities, either from purchase or own production but excluding food aid? (tick one box below)

Commodity	readily available	occasionally available	Not / rarely available	Most common source (local shops/ GMB/ local black market/ own production) - choose one	Most Common Price (Z\$)	Per Unit
Cereal grain						
Maize meal						
Bread/ flour						
Sugar						
Salt						
Vegetables						
Groundnuts						
Beans						
Cooking oil						

2.1 Since the beginning of September, how many GMB deliveries has this village received? \_\_\_\_\_

2.2 How many households on average were able to purchase maize per delivery? \_\_\_\_\_

2.3 For those who were able to purchase from the GMB, what was the average total quantity (kgs) purchased per household since September? \_\_\_\_\_

2.4 Were the deliveries from the GMB adequate for this village? YES/ NO

2.5 If GMB food was not enough for everyone, who decided which households could purchase the food? (tick one or more of the following):

- Councillor \_\_\_\_\_
- chief/ traditional authorities \_\_\_\_\_
- community \_\_\_\_\_
- first come, first served/ queuing \_\_\_\_\_
- others (specify: \_\_\_\_\_) \_\_\_\_\_

2.6 How was the distribution of GMB food carried out?

Explain: \_\_\_\_\_

2.7. Are there any concerns with this process? YES/ NO

Explain:

**Grain Prices**

3. Indicate the current purchasing prices for maize and wheat from GMB and local market sources:

Source/ Quantity	Maize	Wheat
GMB, 50kg bag		
GMB, 20kg bucket		
Local markets, 50kg bag		
Local markets, 20kg bucket		

**Livestock**

4. What are the average or most common current selling prices for:

- a. average cattle \_\_\_\_\_
- b. average goat \_\_\_\_\_
- c. average chicken \_\_\_\_\_
- d. average donkey \_\_\_\_\_

5. Compared to the same period last year (September to November), has the volume of sales of each type of livestock increased or decreased? (Tick the relevant box, and explain why)

	Increased	Decreased	No Change	Explanation
Cattle				
Goat				
Donkey				
Chicken				

6. For those who are selling, what is the most common reason for selling their animals? (Tick one)

- Need money for food \_\_\_\_\_
- Need money for other expenses \_\_\_\_\_
- Want to sell before livestock value/ condition declines \_\_\_\_\_
- Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_) \_\_\_\_\_

7.1 Compared to last year, has there been any increase in animal deaths over the last three months? (Tick the relevant category)

More than last year \_\_\_\_\_ No Change \_\_\_\_\_ Less than last year \_\_\_\_\_

7.2 What is the main cause of death? (Tick one) Disease \_\_\_\_\_ Drought \_\_\_\_\_ Other \_\_\_\_\_

8. Compared to last year, has there been an abnormal amount of livestock slaughtered? (Tick the relevant category)

More than last year \_\_\_\_\_ No Change \_\_\_\_\_ Less than last year \_\_\_\_\_

**Casual Labour/ Piecework**

9.1 What is the most common type of casual or agricultural labour that people here currently engage in? \_\_\_\_\_

9.2 What is the current average daily rate of payment casual labour rate for an average able-bodied man?

In Z\$ \_\_\_\_\_ or Kg maize \_\_\_\_\_

9.3 What is the current average daily rate of payment casual labour rate for an average able-bodied woman?

In Z\$ \_\_\_\_\_ or Kg maize \_\_\_\_\_

10. Has the availability of laboring opportunities changed compared to the same time last year? (Tick one)

Increased \_\_\_\_\_ Decreased \_\_\_\_\_ Unchanged \_\_\_\_\_

11. Has the number of people looking for labor changed compared to same time last year? (Tick one)  
 Increased \_\_\_\_ Decreased \_\_\_\_ Unchanged \_\_\_\_
12. Overall, compared to last year at this time, is it easier or more difficult for people to find casual labour?  
 More difficult than last year \_\_\_\_ Less difficult \_\_\_\_ Unchanged \_\_\_\_
- 13.1 Have government food-for-work/ public works programmes been run here since September? YES/ NO
- 13.2 What percentage of the population have been employed on these programmes? \_\_\_\_%
- 13.3 What percentage of the population have been receiving payment without working (i.e. not able-bodied, elderly, "Social Welfare Cases")? \_\_\_\_%
- 13.4 Over that period, what is the average total payment that has been actually been received? Z\$ \_\_\_\_\_

**Formal Employment and Remittances**

- 14.1 Are there people in this area who have lost their jobs since August? YES/NO
- 14.2 Where were they mainly employed? (Rank the 3 most important (1,2,3))
- local formal employment \_\_\_\_\_
  - small urban centre formal employment \_\_\_\_\_
  - large urban centre formal employment \_\_\_\_\_
  - commercial farm work \_\_\_\_\_
  - other rural areas \_\_\_\_\_
  - other \_\_\_\_\_

15. Has the flow of remittances changed since August? (Tick one)  
 Increased \_\_\_\_ Decreased \_\_\_\_ Unchanged \_\_\_\_

**Coping Strategies**

16. If maize is not available, what are people mainly eating instead? (List 3 main substitutes)

Item
1.
2.
3.

- 17.1 Compared to a normal year, are people eating more or less wild foods?  
 More \_\_\_\_ Less \_\_\_\_ Unchanged \_\_\_\_
- 17.2 Are they eating types of wild food that would normally not be consumed? YES/ NO
- 18.1 Are people getting income from sources that they do not normally use? YES/ NO
- 18.2 If yes, what are the three main sources?  
 1. \_\_\_\_\_ 2. \_\_\_\_\_ 3. \_\_\_\_\_
- 19.1 Have there been school dropouts in the area since August? YES/ NO
- 19.2 If "Yes", what is the rough percentage of all school children who have dropped out? \_\_\_\_\_ %
- 19.3 Explain the reasons for dropouts: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

**Population Movements**

- 20.1 Compared to last year, has the migration of people out of this village been higher or lower than normal?  
 Higher than normal \_\_\_\_ Lower than normal \_\_\_\_ No change \_\_\_\_

20.2 Compared to last year, has the migration of people into this village been higher or lower than normal?  
Higher than normal \_\_\_\_ Lower than normal \_\_\_\_ No change \_\_\_\_

20.3 Considering that people can move in and move out of the village, overall has the net migration been into or out of the village? IN / OUT

20.4 What were the main reasons for population movements? (tick for reason and direction of movement)

- Searching for food In \_\_\_\_ Out \_\_\_\_
- Searching for employment In \_\_\_\_ Out \_\_\_\_
- Resettlement/ Commercial Farm Closures In \_\_\_\_ Out \_\_\_\_
- Other \_\_\_\_\_ In \_\_\_\_ Out \_\_\_\_

**Vulnerable Groups**

21. In most villages, some households are more vulnerable to food shortages than others. Who are the **most vulnerable** households in this village? Describe in detail.

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22. Roughly what percentage of the village population are these most vulnerable households? \_\_\_\_%

23. Do female-headed households have any particular difficulties in accessing grain? YES/ NO

Explain:

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24. Do households with chronically ill adults have any particular difficulties in accessing grain? YES/ NO

Explain:

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25. Do child-headed households have any particular difficulties in accessing maize? YES/ NO

Explain:

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26. All things considered, and assuming that supplies were available to purchase, what percentage of the population do you estimate could buy the food they needed in the following circumstances...

- at local market (uncontrolled) prices? \_\_\_\_%
- at GMB prices? \_\_\_\_%
- couldn't afford at all? \_\_\_\_%

27.1 Other than for financial reason, have there been any households who have not been able to buy GMB food since August if it has been available? YES/ NO

27.2 If "yes", approximately what percentage of households have not been able to buy GMB food? \_\_\_\_%

27.3 Explain why those people have not been able to buy GMB food:

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**Food Aid**

28.1 Since the beginning of September, how many general food aid deliveries have you received from WFP or NGOs? (n.b. general rations only, not supplementary feeding) \_\_\_\_

28.2 How many households were able to receive maize since September? \_\_\_\_

28.3 What was the average quantity distributed per household?

Maize	_____kg
Pulses	_____kg
Oil	_____litres

28.4 If food aid was rationed, who selected the people to be targeted? \_\_\_\_\_

28.5 How the selection of beneficiaries done?

Explain: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

29. Are there any concerns with the way the selection of beneficiaries is made? YES/ NO

Explain: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

30. Are there any households who are entitled to receive food aid, but who are not receiving? YES/ NO

Explain: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

31.1 Is supplementary feeding currently being provided for children in this village? YES/ NO

31.2 If yes, approximately what percentage are under 5s are receiving supplementary feeding? \_\_\_\_%

**Agricultural inputs**

32. Considering how much land farmers intend (or intended) to plant, what portion of farmers have enough of the following inputs (from any source) for timely cultivation this season?

Maize seed	Pulses seed	Basal Fertiliser	Top Dressing
32.1:           %	32.2:           %	32.3:           %	32.4:           %

33. What is the current price of maize seed in the location where most people are accessing it? (indicate price per unit)

Price (Z\$): \_\_\_\_ for \_\_\_\_kg

**34. What is the main source of cereal seed this year for most farmers (tick one)**

- Market Purchase \_\_\_\_\_
- GMB \_\_\_\_\_
- NGO/ UN \_\_\_\_\_
- retained seed \_\_\_\_\_
- other \_\_\_\_\_

35. What percentage of farmers have already planted the majority of their land? \_\_\_\_%

36.1 Is the total anticipated area planted to cereal crops for this season different compared to last year? (tick one)

Bigger \_\_\_\_                      Smaller \_\_\_\_                      Unchanged \_\_\_\_

36.2 Explain Why: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

37.1 Is the total anticipated area planted to pulses for this season different compared to last year?

Bigger \_\_\_\_                      Smaller \_\_\_\_                      Unchanged \_\_\_\_

37.2 Explain Why: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

38. What is the earliest month that you expect to have some cereal for consumption (including green consumption)?

39. As compared to a normal year, so far this season have the rains been poor, adequate or very good? (tick one)  
Poor \_\_\_\_ Adequate \_\_\_\_ Very Good \_\_\_\_

**Questions for Female Focus Group**

40. In most villages, some people are more vulnerable to food shortages than others. What characteristics do the **most vulnerable** people in this village have? Describe in detail.  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

41. Roughly what percentage of the village population are these most vulnerable people? \_\_\_\_\_%

42.1 Are people getting income from sources that they do not normally use? YES/ NO

42.2 If yes, what are the three main sources?

1. \_\_\_\_\_ 2. \_\_\_\_\_ 3. \_\_\_\_\_

43. Do female-headed households have any particular difficulties in accessing grain? YES/ NO

Explain: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

44. Do households with chronically ill adults have any particular difficulties in accessing grain? YES/ NO

Explain: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

45. Do child-headed households have any particular difficulties in accessing maize? YES/ NO

Explain: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

46.1 Other than for financial reason, have there been any households who have not been able to buy GMB food since August if it has been available? YES/ NO

46.2 If "yes", approximately what percentage of households have not been able to buy GMB food? \_\_\_\_\_%

46.3 Explain why those people have not been able to buy GMB food:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

47. Are there any households who are entitled to receive food aid from WFP or NGOs, but who are not receiving? YES/ NO

Explain: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

48.1 Has children's health been affected by the food crisis? YES/ NO

**48.2 If yes, how is it different from a normal year? (tick relevant category)**

- a. Nutritional status: better ( )      the same ( )      worse ( )  
b. Health status:    better ( )      the same ( )      worse ( )

48.3 If health is worse, what are the diseases that have gotten worse: (tick where applicable)

- Cough \_\_\_\_\_
- Fever \_\_\_\_\_
- Malaria \_\_\_\_\_
- Diarrhea \_\_\_\_\_
- Measles \_\_\_\_\_
- Other (specify: \_\_\_\_\_) \_\_\_\_\_

49. If any children's nutritional status has got worse, do their families have any particular characteristics?

Explain: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_